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Since Rule 803(3) is. an exception, the court should examine the conse-
quences of admitting evidence under the rule more carefully and offer the
protection of the hearsay rule to the defendant unless the proffered evi-
dence clearly satisfies the conditions of a hearsay exception.
SALLY F. PRUET
XII. HABEAS CORPUS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Federal Habeas Corpus
Federal courts may issue writs of habeas corpus' to protect federal
prisoners' constitutional rights.2 Gradually, the scope of federal habeas
corpus review has been expanded3 from a limited inquiry into the proper
jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal' to post conviction review of a judg-
I The phrase "habeas corpus" refers to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, known as the "Great Writ." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976).
2 State courts and federal courts share the responsibility of administering federal consti-
tutional law. The doctrine of federal-state comity requires federal courts to defer considera-
tion of federal constitutional questions raised in prosecutions under state law until state
courts have fully considered those questions. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1048 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Habeas
Corpus]. See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator].
Congress extended federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to "all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law
of the United States. . . ." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Although the Act
extended federal habeas corpus to persons in custody pursuant to state court judgments, the
federal courts continued to limit consideration of the writ to the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 (1976); see, e.g., Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192
(1906); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895). Federal courts may inquire into the
legality of the confinement of any state prisoner, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976), or any federal
prisoner, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), who falls within the custody requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3) (1976). See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See generally Fourth Circuit
Review, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 433, 564-84 (1978); see also Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217, 221 (1969) (habeas corpus extended to all constitutional claims of state prisoners);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (adequate and independent state ground no longer
precluded review of constitutional claim on habeas corpus); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
312-18 (1963) (outlined circumstances necessitating fact-finding hearings on habeas corpus);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471-76 (1953) (federal constitutional rights extended to states
through fourteenth amendment are cognizable on habeas corpus); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (habeas corpus extended to due process claims); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 376-77 (1879) (habeas corpus appropriate to inquire into legality of imprisonment for
violation of constitutionally questioned statute). Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YAX. L. J. 895 (1966);
Note, Applying Stone v. Powell: Full and Fair Litigation of a Fourth Amendment Habeas
Corpus Claim, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 319, 320-23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Full and Fair
Litigation].
I At common law, the writ was used to insure that prisoners were properly charged and
brought to trial within a specific time. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U.
Cm. L. REv. 243-, 244-45 (1965); see Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REv. 335, 341-61 (1952). The original grant of habeas
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ment, focusing on whether constitutional rights were violated. 5 In Stone v.
Powell,8 the Supreme Court reversed this expansionary trend by limiting
the substantive claims cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 7 The
Stone Court held that if a state provided a prisoner with an "opportunity
for full and fair litigation"$ of his fourth amendment claim,9 he was not
corpus jurisdiction to the federal courts was included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
14, 1 Stat. 81, 81-82, with the limitation that the writ only extend to prisoners held in custody
by the United States. Early cases limited the use of the writ to testing the jurisdiction of the
trial court. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 22 (1876).
Bator, supra note 2, at 444-45. In Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 1*04-05 (1942), the
Supreme Court abandoned the-restraint of jurisdiction on habeas corpus, recognizing that the
writ was available to consider the constitutionality of the conviction as well as the sentencing
court's jurisdiction. See McFeely, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to Burger,
28 BAYLOR L. REv. 533, 535 (1976). See generally Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L. J. 50 (1956);
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rzv.
461 (1960).
6 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the petitioner was arrested for violating a vagrancy
ordinance, but was later charged with murder and convicted on the basis of evidence seized
during a search incident to the vagrancy arrest. Id. at 469-70. The petitioner alleged that the
evidence should have been excluded because the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional
and therefore his arrest was illegal. Id. at 470. The federal district court denied his petition
for habeas corpus, concluding that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule did not require its application to bar the admission
of evidence obtained incident to a valid arrest. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling, Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), concluding that the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, that the petitioner's arrest was therefore illegal, and
that although the exclusion of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose with regard to
police officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve the public
interest by deterring legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes. Id. at 98.
1 428 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court restricted the scope of federal habeas corpus review
by denying federal habeas corpus relief when a state had provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a petitioner's fourth amendment claim. Id. After considering the burden
imposed on the federal judicial system by habeas corpus proceedings, the Court concluded
that since application of the exclusionary rule, see note 9 infra, was not literally required by
the fourth amendment, see, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976), the reconsi-
deration of fourth amendment claims on collateral review was not constitutionally compelled.
Id. at 481. See generally Full and Fair Litigation, supra note 3, at 327. The Supreme Court's
previous treatment of federal habeas corpus affected only isolated procedural areas, e.g.,
Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (inadequacy of counsel in case involving guilty plea
renders case cognizable on habeas corpus).
8 See notes 11, 26, 28 & 33, infra; text accompanying note 37 infra. See generally Com-
ment, Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for Full and Fair
Litigation," 30 VAND. L. REv. 881 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Circuits Split]; Full and Fair
Litigation, supra note 3, at 330.
1 The constitution provides that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule is the judicially created remedy for
violations of this constitutional right. 428 U.S. at 486, citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974). Implementation of the exclusionary rule enforces the fourth amendment
proscription against illegal search and seizure by prohibiting the introduction of evidence
gained as a result of a fourth amendment violation. Id. at 482. However, application of the
exclusionary rule had been partially limited prior to Stone. See, e.g., United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974) (fourth amendment does not preclude presentation of illegally
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entitled to habeas corpus relief.1" The Stone opinion, however, provided
few guidelines on the proper application of the opportunity for full and fair
litigation standard in habeas corpus proceedings." The Court's failure to
clearly define this standard has left the task of construing the "opportunity
for full and fair litigation" standard to the lower federal courts.
The Fourth Circuit addressed the "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion" standard for the first time in Doleman v. Muncy, 12 and denied federal
habeas corpus relief since the applicable state practice afforded petitioner
an opportunity to raise his fourth amendment claims. 3 In Doleman, the
petitioner was arrested for armed robbery after he and two companions
were stopped and ordered out of their vehicle by police. 5 A witness"6 who
seized evidence in grand jury proceedings). See generally Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calan-
dra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974)
(due process requires exclusionary rule be deemed personal constitutional right); Tushnet,
Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975
Wis. L. REv. 484 (propriety of entertaining fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus).
1" 428 U.S. at 494. See generally Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus after Stone v. Powell: A
Remedy Only for the Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 291 (1977); Note, Recent
Developments-Stone v. Powell-Federal Habeas Corpus and Fourth Amendment Claims,
41 ALB. L. REv. 172 (1977).
11 Although the Court did not define the full and fair litigation standard, it indicated
that Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), was relevant in determining when full and fair
litigation had been provided. 428 U.S. at 494 n.36. In Townsend, the Court outlined circum-
stances in which a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas corpus peti-
tioner. 372 U.S. at 313. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976). The Townsend criteria provided
a definition of adequacy for state fact finding proceedings. The "adequacy" of the proceedings
depended on the procedures and opportunities available to the petitioner at trial and on direct
review as well as the extent to which the petitioner took advantage of those opportunities.
Developments-Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1123 n.47. Under Townsend, "fullness" and
"fairness" can be equated with procedural due process. The Townsend decision outlines the
criteria required in fact finding hearings to meet the "full and fair" standard and thus comply
with procedural due process. Because the Townsend definition of fullness and fairness is
relevant to Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.36, the "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard
would require habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim whenever procedural due
process had been denied in the state system. "Full" and "fair," when used by the Supreme
Court, have been interpreted to require a procedure which satisfies the minimum constitu-
tional requirements of procedural due process. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTrrmoNAL LAw 183, 202
n.48 (2d ed. 1969).
I 579 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1978).
11 Id. at 1265. Since Doleman lacked the benefit of the Fourth Circuit interpretation of
the full and fair litigation standard, the court remanded the case to allow Doleman to file a
second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1266.
"4 Doleman was sentenced by a Virginia state court, following a trial without a jury, to
serve a term of twelve years for armed robbery. Id. at 1261.
1" Id. at 1260. The Fourth Circuit relied exclusively on the statement of facts appearing
in Doleman's two pro se petitions and inferences drawn therefrom. No answer was required
from the state, and no part of the state record was before the court. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit was not certain of the validity of facts before it.
Doleman's petitions contained no explanation of why the officers stopped the car or who
owned the car. Doleman contended, however, that his arrest was not based upon probable
cause and that the seized evidence and the witness' identification of him should have been
suppressed. Id. at 1260 n.3.
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had seen the crime apparently identified them as the robbers. 7 The police
then conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle.' 8 During Doleman's
trial for armed robbery, the prosecution allegedly introduced evidence ob-
tained from that search after the court overruled Doleman's motion to
suppress.'" Doleman was subsequently convicted in state court of armed
robbery and was denied review by the Supreme Court of Virginia2 0 as well
as by the United States Supreme Court.2 ' The federal district court dis-
missed Doleman's federal habeas corpus petition. That court found that
his fourth amendment claims22 were barred by the Supreme Court holding
in Stone v. Powell, and that he had not pleaded sufficient facts in his
petition to demonstrate that the witness' pretrial identification of him was
unconstitutionally prejudicial.?
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Doleman argued that Stone required
a two-step procedural analysis, regardless of the court's substantive inter-
pretation of Stone. Doleman contended that the court should first consider
whether the state prisoner was given a full and fair hearing on his fourth
amendment claim.2 4 If he was not given such a hearing, Doleman con-
tended that the court should then consider whether he was given the oppor-
tunity for one.? Doleman offered two substantive interpretations of Stone's
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard. Doleman's first inter-
pretation required a district court to review thoroughly the state court
record to determine if all required procedural steps were taken.2 1 If the
,S The Fourth Circuit was unable to ascertain whether the witness was an eyewitness to
the armed robber or a victim. Id. at 1260.
'7 Id.; see note 15 supra.
579 F.2d at 1260; see note 15 supra.
" 579 F.2d at 1260; see note 15 supra. Doleman alleged that the arresting officers ob-
tained evidence by illegally searching defendant's car without permission, a search warrant,
or probable cause to look for weapons. Id.
Doleman v. Virginia, 216 Va. lxv (1976).
2 Doleman v. Virginia, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
22 Doleman's fourth amendment claims concerned the introduction of evidence allegedly
obtained during the search following his illegal arrest. However, Doleman's petition did not
specify what evidence he referred to. 579 F.2d at 1260 n.8; see text accompanying notes 14-
19 supra.
n Doleman contended that the suggestive nature of the pretrial show up violated his due
process rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The Fourth Circuit held that the
admissability test outlined in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (due process violations
in pretrial identification proceedings to be judged by totality of the circumstances), should
be applied to the identification issue to ascertain if an issue of constitutional magnitude was
presented. 579 F.2d at 1266, 1267. The court remanded the identification issue, instructing
the district court to allow Doleman to detail the facts which support his assertion that the
show up was unconstitutional. Id.
24 579 F.2d at 1263.
2Id.
2' Doleman's first interpretation was based on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Stone
in Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1977). The Graves court rejected a literal applica-
tion of Townsend as the sole measure of full and fair consideration when legal rather than
factual questions were at issue, id. at 476, since Stone mandated only an opportunity for full
and fair adjudication in state court, and did not require actual adjudication. Id. at 746. The
court did agree, however, that Townsend was of some help in defining the full and fair
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state had adhered to the proper procedure, the state prisoner would not
be entitled to an inquiry into the substantive merits of his fourth amend-
ment claim.Y The second substantive interpretation urged by Doleman
also required a thorough review of the state record, but focused on whether
the proceedings allowed a full and fair resolution of the fourth amendment
claim.2 Thus, the district court would be permitted to examine the merits
of the petitioner's claim to determine if they were fully and fairly litigated.
If the record revealed that they were not, the district court would decide
whether the state provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation. If the
court found that such an opportunity was not afforded, it may then con-
sider the merits of the claim.
2 9
The state contended that the district court correctly interpreted Stone
and properly dismissed Doleman's petition. ° The state argued that the
Stone Court was concerned with the adequacy of state procedures, not with
the results of the hearing on the fourth amendment claim." Thus, the state
reasoned that federal courts should not review state court convictions un-
less the petitioner shows that he was denied an opportunity to fully and
fairly litigate his fourth amendment claims in the state court.32 If an ade-
quate procedural vehicle was provided by the state, Stone would require
the district court to deny the petition for habeas corpus relief.3
standard. Id., citing O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (1978). The Graves court concluded that to allow a federal district court to
overrule a state court's resolution of whether there was probable cause to admit evidence
obtained in a particular search conflicts with Stone's declaration that federal courts are to
regard state judges as being as capable as federal judges to uphold the fourth amendment
values. 556 F.2d at 746.
2 556 F.2d at 746.
2 Doleman's second interpretation was based on the Second Circuit's decision in Sim-
mons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977). In Simmons, the state supreme court refused
to hear testimony on petitioner's fourth amendment claim after holding that the state trial
court's findings were fairly supported by the record. Id. at 68-69. Because no "serious proce-
dural errors" were found in the state supreme court's refusal to consider Simmons' fourth
amendment claims, the Second Circuit denied habeas corpus relief, holding that the state
courts had provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation where the petitioner's claim
was decided on the merits in the trial court and no inadequacies were found in the state
appellate procedures. Id. at 69. Thus, the Simmons court seemed to require that the claim
be considered on the merits by the state courts either at trial or on direct review.




*3 The state relied on decisions in other circuits to support its conclusion that the district
court should focus on the opportunity portion of the standard. Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d
830, 833 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1977). In Dupont, the petitioner contended that he was denied an opportunity for full
and fair litigation because the state court erred in its decision by finding the existence of
probable cause in a highly arguable situation. The First Circuit held, however, that since the
state court found probable cause and the conviction was affirmed on appeal, Stone precluded
the court from considering the claim on habeas corpus. 555 F.2d at 17. The state also relied
on the en banc decision of Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977), to support its
interpretation that Stone required "opportunity" to be analyzed before "full and fair hear-
1979]
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court, adopting the state's
construction of the "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard.
3 4
The court specifically held that a district court, facing allegations present-
ing fourth amendment claims 3"5 on habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 225436 should first consider whether or not the petitioner was afforded
an opportunity to raise those claims under the applicable state practice.37
Noting that the state practice applicable to Doleman's case provided him
with a mechanism for raising his fourth amendment claim,38 the Fourth
Circuit concluded that Doleman's petition was properly denied. 39 More-
over, the court held that the district court need not inquire further into the
merits of a petitioner's case unless he alleged in his petition that his oppor-
tunity for a full and fair litigation had been impaired. 0 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the burden is on the defendant to plead and prove4 the
facts which support his contention that he did not receive an opportunity
for a full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment claim. 2
The Doleman court's interpretation of the "opportunity for full and fair
litigation" standard is consistent with the reasoning in Stone. 13 By focusing
ing." In Gates, the Second Circuit focused on the "opportunity" aspect, noting that Gates
had not argued that New York statutes failed to provide the requisite procedural devices
which were necessary to afford him an opportunity to raise his fourth amendment claims. Id.
at 837. In fact, New York statutes expressly provided a mechanism for the suppression of
evidence which was allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. Thus, Gates
had the opportunity at trial to raise his fourth amendment claims. The Gates court did
indicate two instances in which Stone would not preclude federal habeas corpus review.
Habeas corpus review is available if the state does not provide corrective procedures to redress
fourth amendment violations, id. at 840; see United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 418
F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), and where the state provides
a corrective process which the defendant is precluded from utilizing because of an unconscion-
able breakdown in the state process. 568 F.2d at 840; see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915); Bator, supra note 2, at 456-57.
11 579 F.2d at 1265. The court specifically stated that it agreed with Second Circuit's
decision in Gates. Id.; see note 33 supra.
11 Since Stone's restriction on the scope of habeas corpus relief was based on the dimin-
ishing value of the exclusionary rule, see note 7 supra, and the increasing costs of its applica-
tion in collateral review, the Stone rationale cannot be extended to restrict habeas corpus
claims based on other constitutional rights. See Boyte, supra note 10, at 298.
3' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) allows federal courts to inquire into the legality of the
confinement of a state prisoner.
1 579 F.2d at 1265. The Fourth Circuit stated that the applicable state court practice
should be determined from applicable state court decisions, relevant state statutes and from
judicial notice of state practice by the district court. Id.
3X Id.; see VA. CODE § 19.2-60 (1950); VA. S. CT. R. 3A:28 (Supp. 1971).
579 F.2d at 1265.
40 Id. Impairment of the "opportunity" could result from the absence of a state procedure
for considering fourth amendment violations. Id. at n.14. Impairment could also arise where
the defendant is unable to utilize the corrective process because that process malfunctions.
However, the defendant may not allege impairment of his opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate if he deliberately by-passes the state's procedure. Id.
4' The burden placed on the petitioner to plead the impairment is consistent with Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.37 (1976).
11 579 F.2d at 1265.
13 See note 7 supra.
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on the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment claim, the court limited
the inquiry required in habeas corpus proceedings to an analysis of the
state procedures for raising fourth amendment claims." Thus, even if
fourth amendment claims are never litigated in state court proceedings, a
prisoner is precluded from habeas corpus relief if he had the opportunity
to raise those claims unless that opportunity was impaired for some reason
other than a deliberate bypass of the procedure provided by the state.45
This interpretation of the opportunity for full and fair litigation standard
also comports with decisions in other circuits which have interpreted the
standard.46 Although' other circuit courts have focused on different cri-
teria,4 7 the majority of the decisions have concluded that the opportunity
for full and fair litigation is satisfied when state procedures are adequate
for raising fourth amendment claims.4"
By interpreting the "opportunity for full and fair litigation" standard
to limit the scope of habeas corpus relief in this manner,49 the Fourth
Circuit has placed a significant burden on the state courts to insure that a
state prisoner's federal constitutional rights are protected. The Doleman
court's decision effectively forecloses federal habeas corpus remedies from
state prisoners where state procedures afford the prisoner the opportunity
to raise his fourth amendment claim. This decision may encourage state
courts to assume a more active role in protecting individual rights" by
developing more adequate post conviction proceedings. Such develop-
ments would help to relieve the burden habeas corpus proceedings placed
" See note 37 supra.
" See note 40 supra.
" See, e.g., Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1976) (fourth amend-
ment claims raised at state habeas corpus proceedings fulfill full and fair litigation require-
ment); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (full and fair litigation requires
consideration of disputed facts relating to fourth amendment claims at trial court and availa-
bility of meaningful appellate review). See notes 26, 28 & 33 supra. See generally Circuits
Split, supra note 8, at 881; Full and Fair Litigation, supra note 3, at 330.
' See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
" See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977); Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743
(5th Cir. 1977); Sandoval v. Aaron, 562 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1977); Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15
(1st Cir. 1977); Simmons v. Clemente, 552 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright,
546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); Rigsbee
v. Parkinson, 545 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976).
" For a discussion of the policy judgments of courts in restricting availability of federal
habeas corpus review, see Note, Stone v. Powell and New Federalism: A Challenge to
Congress, 14 HARv. J. LEGis. 152 (1976).
See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). Some state courts have construed state constitutional provisions
to guarantee more protection that the federal constitution's counterparts. See, e.g., State v.
Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (right to trial by jury exists even for petty offense); People v.
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974) (suspect is entitled to assistance of counsel at
any pretrial lineup or photographic identification procedure); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349,
346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent to custodial search must be tested by waiver standard).
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on federal district courts and eliminate a major source of friction in federal-
state relations,5' and thus implement the Stone rationale.
SUSAN M. YODER
B. Prisoners' Rights
Duty of Court to Assist Prisoner Pro Se Litigant
Historically, courts treated inmates as forfeiting not only their liberty,
but also their constitutional rights.' Prisoners now, however, retain most
of their constitutional rights upon incarceration2 including the right of
access to the courts.' Although several remedies are available to inmates
who have been denied their constitutional rights,4 the most frequently
employed means of redress is an action in federal courts under the Civil
5, Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970); Wright &
Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 901 n.21 (1966); Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal
Habeas Corpus, 80 HAv. L. REv. 442, 428-38 (1966).
1 See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 792, 796 (1871) (the Bill of
Rights governs freemen and not convicted felons; a prisoner is a mere slave of the state).
2 The modern view gives the prisoner most of his preincarceration privileges. See Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Many privileges, however, are necessarily limited
during imprisonment. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948) (otherwise
unqualified right of parties to conduct their oral arguments personally before appellate court
must be modified in its application to prisoners). Furthermore, inmates may not be afforded
complete constitutional protection in every prison setting. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (prisoner facing possible sanctions in disciplinary hearing is not entitled
to appointed counsel even though alleged offense may result in criminal prosecution).
3 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (state prison regulation requiring approval
of habeas corpus petitions by prison authorities invalid since it impaired inmates' right of
access to federal courts). Since Hull, the Supreme Court has expanded the right of access to
insure that prisoner access is adequate, effective, and meaningful. See Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Alpert, Prisoners' Right of Access to Courts: Planning for Legal Aid, 51
WASH. L. REv. 653, 655-64 (1976); Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access: Does Bounds Have
Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1978).
1 See generally KERPER & KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CONVICT 318 (1974); Zagaris,
Recent Developments in Prison Litigation: Procedural Issues and Remedies, 14 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 810, 811-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Zagaris]. One legal remedy available to
wronged prisoners is a civil tort suit in state court against prison officials. See Zagaris, supra
at 812. Also, prisoners may seek a writ of mandamus to compel prison authorities to take
affirmative action to redress violations of constitutional rights occurring within the penal
institution. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
175, 265-67 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarb & Singer]. This type of relief, however, is
difficult to obtain. Id. at 266. Another remedy frequently employed in the past for attacking
the legal basis of incarceration and conditions of confinement was the habeas corpus petition.
Id. at 267. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500 (1973), the Supreme Court limited
the use of the habeas corpus petition to actions challenging the fact of confinement, holding
that those complaints seeking relief from the conditions of incarceration were properly charac-
terized as civil rights claims. See Zagaris, supra at 823.
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Rights Act of 1871.1 In the past, federal courts were reluctant to review
state prisoner complaints' when the plaintiff had not exhausted all state
remedies,' but the modem view allows greater prisoner access to federal
courts.'
Since many prisoners are indigent, inmate claims for civil rights viola-
tions are often brought in forma pauperis' and litigated pro se.'0 The Su-
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was originally enacted as Act of
April 20, 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (Ku Klux Klan Act) and provides that any person
whose constitutional rights have been violated by anyone acting under color of state law may
sue in law or equity for relief. Section 1983 contains no jurisdictional provision and most civil
rights litigants rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). See Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights
Litigation under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. RIv. 803, 810-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Review of Prisoners' Rights]. Section 1343(3) grants original jurisdiction to federal courts
for civil actions brought for deprivation of a federally protected right. Although the Supreme
Court has never expressly decided whether state courts also may exercise jurisdiction in §
1983 claims, the majority of federal courts hold that concurrent jurisdiction exists. See, e.g.,
Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d 93, 98 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975); Review
of Prisoners' Rights, supra at 812.
To present a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove he was deprived of a federally
protected right by a person acting under color of state authority. In prisoner cases, the "action
under color of state law" requirement is not difficult to prove because all prison officials
derive their authority from state law. See Review of Prisoners' Rights, supra at 815.
1 The reluctance of the federal judiciary to entertain state inmate actions was termed
the "hands-off' doctrine. See Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 846 (1954) (federal courts do not have the power to regulate the internal management
and discipline of prisons operated by the state); Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 4, at 181. See
generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1962).
Section 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state judicial or administrative
remedies before bringing suit in federal court. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 427 (1975);
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-73 (196). Thus, though the majority of
federal courts do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, see, e.g., McCray
v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 364-65 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as improvid. granted 426 U.S. 471
(1976), a minority of jurisdictions have found that Supreme Court references to the no-
exhaustion of state administrative remedies rule are mere dicta. Therefore, these jurisdictions
require some type of administrative decision at the state level. See, e.g., Raper v. Lucey, 488
F.2d 748, 751 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally Note, State Prisoners and the Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies: Section 1983 Jurisdiction and the Availability of Adequate State
Remedies, 7 SaroN HAUL L. REv. 366 (1976).
8 See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 4, at 183; see, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 405 (1974) (". . . a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution").
Despite the modem view of the courts in allowing prisoners greater access to federal court, a
new trend in restricting prisoner access is beginning to emerge. See note 56 infra.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976) allows federal courts to authorize any suit without prepayment
of court costs by a person who produces an affidavit showing that by paying the costs he would
be unable to provide himself and his dependants with the necessities of life. See Adkins v.
Dupont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948); Willging, FinancialBarriers and the Access of Indigents
to the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 253, 257 n.26 (1968). Thus, many'prisoner complaints are filed in
forma pauperis. See Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A
Statistical Survey of the Northern District of Illinois, 6 Loy. L.J. 527, 530 (1975); Zeigler &
Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47
N.Y.U.L. REv. 159, 187 n.112 (1972) (93.3% of prisoners in one survey filed in forma pauperis).
,1 See Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More Than a Pawn in
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preme Court requires trial courts to examine pro se prisoner complaints
less stringently than pleadings prepared by attorneys and to refrain from
summary dismissals." In ascertaining whether a prisoner's claim is valid,
federal district courts should not dismiss a pro se pleading unless a federal
claim cannot possibly be extracted from the pleading." Nevertheless, the
question of whether a trial court owes an affirmative duty to aid a pro se
litigant in the preparation of a claim is unsettled.' 3 In a recent Fourth
Circuit decision, Gordon v. Leeke,'4 the court discussed a trial court's duty
to assist a prisoner proceeding without counsel.
In Gordon, the Fourth Circuit consolidated two similar cases for appel-
late argument. The first case involved a pro se complaint by a state pris-
oner against the warden of the South Carolina prison wherein he was
confined and the Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections.
The inmate claimed that certain prison guards had acquiesced in an attack
by other inmates on the complainant." Gordon asserted that he was bru-
tally beaten, robbed and homosexually raped by fellow prisoners while
guards watched passively. The plaintiff sought both damages'" and in-
junctive relief" under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
The district court found the pleading "hopelessly inadequate '"' to al-
lege a cause of action. As initially filed, Gordon's complaint failed to allege
any specific facts, such as the date and place of the attack, the identity of
the attacking prisoners or the guards who witnessed the assault." After
considering the defendant's motion to dismiss,2' the court held that insuffi-
cient facts were present to determine whether Gordon had a colorable
the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 769 (1975); Robbins & Herman, Litigating Without Counsel:
Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROoKLYN L. REv. 629 (1976).
" See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
2 See id. at 521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
,1 For a discussion of the inherent problems and duties of a federal judge in dealing with
prisoner litigation, see Doyle, The Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUD. 406
(1973).
574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 464 (1978).
Id. at 1149.
" Id. Under § 1983, plaintiffs may seek either legal or equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976); see note 5 supra. In awarding damages as legal relief, most courts presume nominal
damages from a violation of constitutional rights. See Note, Measuring Damages for Viola-
tions of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REv. 357, 361 (1974). Compensatory
damages are also recoverable under § 1983. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 885
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, modified in part, aff'd in part sub. nom. Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). In addition, civil rights
plaintiffs may be able to recover punitive damages if they can prove willfullness on the
defendant's part, since such an award is based on punishment rather than compensation. See
Note, Prisoners' Rights Litigation: An Examination into the Appurtenant Procedural
Problems, 2 HoFsTRA L. REv. 345, 371 (1974).
'1 574 F.2d at 1149. Gordon requested the court to issue an order to "correct the adminis-
tration" at his prison. Id.
19 Id.
I Id.
Id. The defendants moved for dismissal, alleging that Gordon's claim failed to state a
cause of action upon which relief could be granted. FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b)(6).
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claim.2' Accordingly, the trial judge required the defendants to supply
additional information in supplemental answers and allowed plaintiff to
respond.3 Gordon's responses to the defendant's supplemental answers
fixed the date of the alleged assault.2? In addition, the affidavit of another
inmate submitted by Gordon corroborated the occurrence of the attack.24
The trial judge then directed the plaintiff to submit affidavits identifying
his assailants and ordered the defendants to submit an affidavit of the
prison official in charge of Gordon's cellblock.? Gordon filed affidavits
which identified one of his attackers and one of the guards known .as
"Reilly."2 Subsequently, the defendants filed documents asserting that
Officer Riley did not work on the date of the alleged attack. 2 Acknowledg-
ing that it was unconvinced that some type of assault had not occurred,
the court nevertheless dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiff
had failed to allege a cause of action because the named defendants, the
warden and the Commissioner, could not be held liable under section
1983. 21
The second case consolidated in Gordon involved a settion 1983 claim
by a Maryland state prisoner against his warden for damages resulting
from loss of the prisoner's personal property. Complainant Young asserted
that while he was absent from his cell during a shakedown search his watch
and watchband disappeared. 2 He contended that the guards were the only
ones present during the search, thereby insinuating that they were respon-
sible for his loss of property." The district court granted the defendant's




22 Id. at 1150.
28 Id.
2Id.
Id. The court concluded that the officials were not liable on the theory of respondeat
superior. The majority of federal courts have held that respondeat superior is inapplicable to
supervisory officials under § 1983 when damages are sought. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d
926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Pate, 445
F.2d 105, 107 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971); Schirott & Drew, The Vicarious Liability of Public Officials
under the Civil Rights Act, 8 AKRON L. REv. 69, 70-71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schirott
& Drew]. To withstand a motion to dismiss based on the nonapplicability of respondeat
superior, the plaintiff must allege direct participation or personal knowledge of the defendant.
See Schirott & Drew, supra at 72. The requirement of direct involvement has been satisfied
when the defendant prison warden ordered the conduct claimed to have violated the plain-
tiff's civil rights. See Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 983 (1971). Also, where a supervisory official has actual knowledge of illegal conduct
and acquiesces it in by failing to take corrective steps, he may be liable under § 1983. See
Patterson v. MacDougall, 506 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1975). Occasionally, courts will hold a
supervisory official liable under respondeat superior when he is negligent in the hiring of his
subordinates. See Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 823 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
866 (1971); accord, Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
574 F.2d at 1150.
0 Id.
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motion to dismiss the pro se complaint, noting that Young not only had
failed to allege the requisite personal involvement by the warden, 3 but he
failed to allege that the warden even knew of the search.2 The trial judge
also denied the plaintiffs subsequent motion to allow amendment of the
complaint.
31
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower courts' dismissals, holding that
the courts should have advised the plaintiffs of the correct persons to sue
and given the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their pleadings accord-
ingly.34 The majority stated that the district court in the South Carolina
case properly concluded that a cognizable claim for damages against the
warden and Commissioner was not presented.3 5 Recognizing, however, that
the prisoner had alleged a valid cause of action that might permit recovery
against the guards, 36 the Fourth Circuit held that the district court should
have advised the plaintiff to amend his complaint to join the identified
guard3 l as a defendant. 38 Relying on similar reasoning, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Maryland prisoner had no cognizable claim against the war-
den. 9 The Gordon majority, however, found that Young might have a valid
claim against the guards."0 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the
11 In order for the doctrine of respondeat superior to apply, Young should have alleged
participation or knowledge by the warden. See note 28 supra.
32 574 F.2d at 1150.
3 Id.
1, Id. at 1152-53.
3 Id. at 1152. In response to Gordon's claim for injunctive relief, see note 17 supra, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that since Gordon did not claim the attack was anything other than
an isolated incident or that it resulted from any administrative policy of the warden, no
injunctive relief was in order. 574 F.2d at 1152.
"' 574 F.2d at 1152. The eighth amendment prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment has been invoked to give prisoners protection against
assaults by fellow inmates. See Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(inmates have a constitutional right to some degree of protection against attacks by other
inmates). See also Note, Eighth Amendment Rights of Prisoners: Adequate Medical Care and
Protection from the Violence of Fellow Inmates, 49 NorE DAME LAw. 454, 465-69 (1973).
Though an isolated attack may not constitute an actionable claim, see Williams v. Field, 416
F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1016 (1970), where prison guards manifest
a deliberate indifference toward a newly incarcerated prisoner being abused nearby and make
no effort to rescue him, at least one court has imposed liability on the prison officials. See
VanHorn v. Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384, 387 (E.D. Va. 1975); cf. Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974) (prison guard not liable where his failure to aid the attacked
inmate was a split-second decision to jump back in self-defense and plaintiff failed to allege
that the guard stood by and allowed further violence after the initial blow).
3, See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
1 574 F.2d at 1152. The court admitted that, on remand after the addition of guard Riley
as a defendant, Gordon may have a weak case with little chance of recovery. The claim,
however, could withstand initial challenges by the defendant since the presence of Riley was
a material fact in dispute and would preclude summary judgment against Gordon. Id.; see
text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. See also Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1202 (4th
Cir. 1971).
3, 574 F.2d at 1152; see note 31 supra.
10 574 F.2d at 1162. Suits by prisoners for loss of property during incarceration are based
on the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Diamond v. Thompson, 523 F.2d 1201, 1203
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lower court should have allowed Young to discover the guards' identities
and advised him to amend his complaint to include them.
41
The Fourth Circuit followed Supreme Court mandates that pleadings
should not be scrutinized so technically as to defeat a valid claim and that
an insufficient claim may be amended to achieve justice.2 The Gordon
majority also relied on the policy of liberality announced in Haines v.
Kerner43 regarding the treatment of prisoner complaints filed pro se. In
Haines, the Supreme Court held that pro se complaints should be scruti-
nized less stringently than attorney-drafted pleadings.44 The Haines court
invoked a high standard for dismissal purposes, emphasizing that a pro se
complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears "beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. 4 5 In addition to its reliance on Haines, the Fourth
Circuit underscored its previous concern for civil rights plaintiffs46 and pro
se litigants.
47
Since the Fourth Circuit has traditionally been solicitous of civil rights
plaintiffs and pro se litigants, its leniency toward section 1983 prisoners
proceeding without counsel is not surprising. Even before the Supreme
Court's decision in Haines v. Kerner,4" the circuit was careful to protect
civil rights actions brought by unrepresented inmates. The court has re-
versed certain lower court dismissals, stating that even though the claims
may be vague, they should not be forfeited due to a failure to state the
cause of action with technical precision.49 The Fourth Circuit also has
(5th Cir. 1975); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, Prisoner Prop-
.erty Deprivations: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 IND. L.J. 257, 258 (1976)
(although many courts sustain actions by prisoners for loss of property, such actions may not
be proper issues for federal litigation).
" 574 F.2d at 1152.
42 Id. at 1151; see Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 792 (1945); Holliday v. Johnston, 313 U.S.
342, 350 (1941).
404 U.S. 519 (1972).
" Id. at 520.
'5 Id. at 521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
" 574 F.2d at 1151; see Burris v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 491 F.2d*762, 763 (4th Cir.
1974) (district court should have advised the plaintiff's counsel of the availability of § 1983);
Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969) (district court dismissal of § 1983 is
error unless it appears certain that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him
to relief).
11 574 F.2d at 1151; see Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975); Canty v.
City of Richmond, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (E.D..Va. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Canty v.
Brown, 526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976), cited in Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) ("although the Court of Appeals cannot mean that
it expects the district courts to assume the role of advocate for the pro se plaintiff, . . ."
district court should construe pro se complaints liberally with a view towards vindicating civil
rights deprivations).
404 U.S. 519 (1972).
" See Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965). See also Wooten v. Shook,
527 F.2d 976, 978 (4th Cir. 1975) (although evidentiary hearings are not required in every case,
district courts ordinarily should require that dismissal motions by defendant be supported
by affidavits rather than predicated on bald denials of plaintiffs assertions).
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rejected summary judgments rendered by district courts when it could
ascertain any possible factual dispute, often remanding such cases to the
lower court for an evidentiary hearing." Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
has required that the assertions of a multiple claim pleading be viewed as
a unit rather than separately.5 1 The circuit's leniency towards the incarcer-
ated also has been reflected in its treatment of pretrial detainees proceed-
ing pro se. 2
In furthering its policy of liberality, the Fourth Circuit has affirmed
district court decisions in cases where the court advised unassisted plain-
tiffs in procedural matters. 3 Yet, prior to Gordon v. Leeke, this liberality
had not resulted in the imposition of an affirmative duty on courts to assist
pro se litigants by advising them of the correct parties to sue. Likewise,
although other federal circuits have been lenient in dealing with prisoner
complaints filed pro se, 4 none has imposed a responsibility on a district
court to assist inmates to the extent required by Gordon.
The most recent trend in prisoner litigation is a limitation of district
court action in state prison administration.5 Courts increasingly are re-
quiring exhaustion of state administrative grievance procedures before en-
tertaining section 1983 claims of prisoners. Such a requirement is based on
policies of comity, the facilitation of subsequent judicial review after a
state administrative agency has exercised its expertise, the development
of a factual record, and saving of judicial time if administrative relief is
11 See Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1202-03 (4th Cir. 1971). But cf. Wester v. Jones,
554 F.2d 1285, 1286 (4th Cir. 1977) (grant of summary judgment upheld even though some
factual disputes existed).
11 See Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 116 (4th Cir. 1977) (though each of several claims
of harassment might not amount to a denial of constitutional rights, lower court should view
claims as unit to determine if prisoner's right of access to courts has been violated).
52 See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1978) (claim of pre-trial detainee
for inadequate medical care dismissed without requiring answer must be reversed).
13 See Wooten v. Shook, 527 F.2d 976, 977 (4th Cir. 1975) (district court's action of
advising a pro se plaintiff that he should file a counter-affidavit opposing defendant's motion
for summary judgment was proper); accord, Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.
1975) (summary judgment improper where plaintiff had not been notified that his failure to
file a counter-affidavit might result in summary judgment against him).
1 See Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975) (case dismissed by district
court remanded to determine whether plaintiff could prove § 1983 claim against warden for
assault by prison guard); Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1975) (civil rights
action by prisoner for inadequate medical care was improperly dismissed where facts not fully
developed); Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court refusal to
docket prisoner complaint was error where plaintiff was not given opportunity to present
evidence); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972) (lower court dismissal without
requiring defendant's answer was reversible error; plaintiff was entitled to evidentiary hearing
on his claim); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (summary judgment
improper where plaintiff did not have chance to present evidence). However, once the facts
are developed and the plaintiff has failed to present facts showing the supervisory official was
personally involved or knew of the violation, it is proper for the district court to dismiss the
action. See note 28 supra.
1 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Note, Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in Federal Courts, 27 CATm. U. L.
REv. 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Limitation of Suits].
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
granted." This recent reluctance of courts to entertain state prisoner suits
is reflected by the dissent in Gordon v. Leeke.57 The dissenting opinion
criticized the majority for placing a duty upon trial courts to actively assist
inmate litigants proceeding without counsel. The dissent read Haines as
only requiring courts to construe prisoner pro se complaints liberally, and
called for a proper balance between the undesirable extremes of advocacy
and strict judicial impartiality."8
At the trial stage, the judicial impartiality doctrine protects both par-
ties from the prejudicial effect on the jury caused by the judge's actions.59
At the pleading stage, however, strict judicial impartiality typically is not
required since the jury is not present." Accordingly, the Haines decision
mandates that courts liberally construe prisoner pro se complaints in the
pretrial proceedings. Yet, trial courts must be careful not to act as advo-
cates for either party, an obviously undesirable role for judges in our adver-
sary system. While a trial judge should be more than a mere moderator
and should intervene when necessary,"1 this intervention has never been
extended to encompass the advising of the complainant of the proper par-
ties to name in order to state a valid cause of action.
Undertaking to advise the plaintiff of the correct parties to sue is dan-
gerously close to being unduly prejudicial towards the plaintiff and is an
improper extension of the Haines rule. The Fourth Circuit majority in
Gordon was willing to extend Haines due to the nature of the case involved.
The suit was a civil one, where the defendant had fewer constitutional
protections, such as the right to counsel." The civil rights character of the
suit, however, made the Fourth Circuit more willing to help the plaintiff
since such cases are often treated leniently in order to promote the policies
11 See Limitations of Suits, supra note 55, at 122-24, n.51. See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE$ OF HANDLING CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS (Tent. Standards 1974), reprinted in Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the
Federal Courts, 1974 Amz. ST. L.J. 549, 557.63.
574 F.2d at 1153-56 (Hall, J., dissenting).
'Id.
5 See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
833 (1975); Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 509 F.2d 1119, 1131 (2d Cir. 1974);
Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1266, 1268 (1975); Note, Judicial Intervention in Trials, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 843.
"' See note 54 supra.
61 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (trial judge may comment on
the evidence if the jury understands it is not bound by his opinion); accord, Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976). Judicial interference claims arise most frequently following
court interrogation of witnesses, which is allowable under certain restrictions. See United
States v. Caisiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 877-78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970) (where
purpose of trial court's questioning was to clarify a factual dispute, such interrogation was
not fatally prejudicial); United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(though trial judge must remain objective, he may participate in the examination of alibi
witnesses where the testimonial presentation promotes uncertainty). See also Gitelson &
Gitelson, A Trial Judge's Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to be an Instrumentality
of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw. 7 (1966).
'2 See note 67 infra.
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of the legislation and vindicate constitutional rights deprivations. 3 But,
even taking into consideration the policy of leniency of civil rights and pro
se plaintiffs, the Gordon decision is without precedent. Though the deci-
sion's requirement of a duty to assist may be imposed for a desirable end,
it is unwarranted in view of other possible solutions.
One possible alternative, suggested in the dissenting opinion, is condi-
tional dismissal. 4 Under the alternative, the district court may condition-
ally dismiss the case until the plaintiff is able to cure the defective plead-
ing by amendment. Another viable alternative to the court undertaking
to assist the pro se litigant in framing his case is the use of questionnaire
forms to ascertain if the plaintiff has a valid claim. Forms which require
the prisoner to recite the facts of his case have been upheld as a useful aid
to courts. 6
In order to avoid the problems of judicial advocacy, a more practical
solution is the appointment of counsel. Although civil litigants have no
constitutional rights to an attorney, 7 federal courts have the discretion to
appoint counsel in appropriate cases.6 A poll of federal judges indicates
that prisoner civil rights litigation could be improved if counsel were
routinely appointed.6 Appointment of counsel in cases such as Gordon
would assure that procedural technicalities do not prevent a prisoner from
protecting his constitutional rights. Also, an attorney would recognize a
patently frivolous claim and would discourage litigation of the claim,
See, e.g., Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (civil rights legislation
should not be interpreted narrowly; § 1983 was designed as comprehensive remedial legisla-
tion); see note 46 supra.
11 574 F.2d at 1154 n.1.
'5 Id.
" See Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1976). While recognizing the usefulness of
questionnaires, the Fifth Circuit noted that the most difficult problem with questionnaires
is framing one that is simple enough for prisoners to understand and pertinent to the claim
asserted. Id. at 892. The Watson court approved the questionnaire recommended by a Federal
Judiciary Center Committee. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, Model Form for Prisoner Civil
Rights Complaints, reprinted in Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 893-98 (5th Cir. 1976).
"7 The sixth amendment right to counsel applies only to criminal prosecutions. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. However, a significant amount of support has arisen for the requirement
of counsel in civil litigation. See Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case For a Legally
Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11 LoY.
L. A. L. REv. 249 (1978); Note, Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Proceedings,
9 MICH. J. L. REF. 554 (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) authorizes the appointment of counsel at the discretion of
the court for suits commenced in forma pauperis. Before Gordon, the Fourth Circuit's rule
concerning appointment of counsel allowed appointment only in exceptional circumstances.
See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975). The court in Gordon, however, found
that if a pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it, the district
court should appoint counsel. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir. 1978). Contra
Alexander v. Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25, 26 (9th Cir. 1976) (counsel should be appointed to aid civil
rights plaintiff only in exceptional circumstances). See also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d
429, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1978); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Hudson v.
Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" See Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 AIz. ST. L.J.
549, 554 [hereinafter cited as Remington].
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thereby removing from the crowded federal court docket complaints which
eventually are characterized as frivolous. 70 Moreover, since federal courts
now have the power to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a
section 1983 suit,71 appointed counsel may be compensated for their efforts.
Thus, there are several solutions to the problems presented by the
unrepresented prisoner litigant, any of which are preferable to that invoked
by Gordon. Accordingly, Gordon's imposition of an affirmative duty on the
trial court to actively advise a pro se plaintiff in constructing his case is
both unprecedented and unnecessary.
CHERYL I. HARRIS
Indifference to the Medical Needs
of a Pretrial Detainee
In Loe v. Armistead,I the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
a pretrial detainee 2 could recover damages from state and federal officers
for medical mistreatment. The court held that section 1983 of title 42 of
the United States Code provided the remedy for mistreatment by state
officers.3 Federal officers were found subject to an action for damages as a
result of their conduct even absent statutory authorization. The court
found that the federal officers could be held liable for damages on the basis
that the detainee's mistreatment was a denial of due process under the
fifth amendment.4
While awaiting trial on federal bank robbery charges,5 Richard Loe
' See Remington, supra note 69, at 555.
T' Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
The underlying policy of awarding attorney's fees in civil rights cases is not only to penalize
the defendants, but to encourage injured individuals to seek judicial relief, thereby furthering
the enforcement of federal law by private means. See Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 205 (1977).
1 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978).
2 A pretrial detainee is one under arrest for commission of a crime, who, because he could
not afford to post bail or because bail is denied, is being held in jail to insure his presence at
trial. See Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); Detainees of Brooklyn House of
Det. for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, Constitutional
Law-Due Process and Equal Protection-Pre-trial Detainees Must Be Held Under the Least
Restrictive Means Possible to Assure the Detainees' Presence at Trial, 3 FoND. URn. L. J. 685
(1975).
582 F.2d at 1293.
1 Id. at 1294. Although the issues in the case arose in the context of a test for pleading
sufficiency in connection with a motion to dismiss, the court made definitive determinations
of the substantive law involved.
Prior to commencement of his suit, Loe was awaiting retrial. The defendants, federal
and state officials, urged that Loe's status was not that of a typical pretrial detainee and that
the court should not accord him the special status usually attached to one in jail awaiting
trial. Brief for Appellees at 17, Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978). The court
granted full pretrial detainee status to Loe, although noting that Loe was awaiting retrial.
582 F.2d at 1293.
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injured his arm when he slipped and fell on the basketball court of a
northern Virginia jail. Although he was immediately taken to the jail infir-
mary, where he was given pain pills, a physician did not examine Loe's arm
until eleven hours later and he was not taken to a hospital until twenty-
two and one-half hours after the injury.' X-rays revealed a fracture and the
arm was placed in a full cast.
After treatment, Loe was transferred by federal marshals to a federal
facility in Springfield, Missouri, for psychiatric tests.7 The marshals iffs-
isted, for security reasons, that Loe's injured arm, although still in a cast,
be handcuffed to his waist for the duration of the twenty-five hour drive
from Virginia to Missouri. In his pro se complaint, Loe charged that federal
marshals and various officials, guards, nurses and the doctor at the jail
violated the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in failing to provide prompt and adequate medical care for the
injury to his arm.8 He also claimed that his treatment en route to Missouri
violated his eighth amendment rights.9
The district court dismissed Loe's complaint for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted.'0 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court," finding that Loe's mistreatment in jail was actionable and his
statement of the claim sufficient.' 2 The court agreed, however, that the
marshals did not violate Loe's rights by handcuffing his injured arm.' 3 The
court affirmed the dismissal of Loe's complaint in that regard.'4 The case
was remanded for a hearing on the merits.'5
The Fourth Circuit stated 'that Loe's claim for mistreatment should be
based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment,'" rather than the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'7
1 582 F.2d at 1292-93. According to jail officials, federal marshals responsible for trans-
porting federal prisoners were notified of Loe's injury. Id. at 1293.
1 Id. at 1293. Loe had expressed an intention to defend the federal bank robbery charges
on grounds of mental incompetency and was transferred to a federal facility in Missouri for
observation. Id.
Id. Loe commenced suit against the city jail employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Id. Suit against federal marshals was premised upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) (1976). Brief
for Appellant at 28, Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978). In his complaint, the
appellant alleged that the federal marshals' failure to promptly respond to calls from jail
officials was sufficient for his recovery of damages. 582 F.2d 1291, Joint Appendix at 44.
582 F.2d at 1293.
" Id. at 1292. The district court's dismissal of Loe's complaint was based on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
1 582 F.2d at 1292.
12 Id. at 1295-96.
11 Id. at 1297. The court found no indication that Loe's arm was seriously injured at the
time of the trip. The court determined that restraints on Loe's physical movement were
appropriate since there was no demonstrated medical necessity for special treatment. Id.
14 Id.
Is Id. at 1297.
Is U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides: "No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
11 582 F.2d at 1294. The eighth amendment provides: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
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Under the terms of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, one cannot be
deprived of liberty without due process of law."8 Punishment is a depriva-
tion of liberty."8 Therefore, punishment prior to a full and fair hearing on
the issue of guilt is a deprivation of liberty without due process which
violates the fifth and fourteenth amendments." The court explained that
pretrial detention is not punishment,21 but rather a means of insuring
apearance of the defendant at trial.Y Therefore, the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable.2 In
sustaining Loe's complaint, the court held, however, that due process is
minimally coextensive with the guarantees of the eighth amendment.2
Thus, the pretrial detainee's complaint framed in eighth amendment
terms was deemed sufficient as a complaint for a violation of due process.2
Seven circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, have considered the issue
of pretrial detainee rights and all agree that unduly harsh conditions of
confinement constitute an unjustifiable punishment of a detainee.20 The
circuits also agree that conditions of confinement must not be more severe
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VIII.
"U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV.
"BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 1398 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2 Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835, 841 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (modifying 438 F.2d 183)
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972). Nosser was the first case in which a circuit
court dealt fully with the rights of pretrial detainees. The case involved an action for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) based on a claimed violation of due process under the four-
teenth amendment. Unsanitary jail conditions and inhumane treatment of pretrial detainees
were held to be summary punishment and therefore a violation of due process. Damages were
allowed. Id. at 841. Although the Supreme Court has not yet discussed the status of detainees,
in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion,
declared that due process protections apply fully even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses. 324 U.S. at 417 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
21 The presumption of innocence prevents the infliction of punishment prior to convic-
tion. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 See Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971); Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v. Eisenstatdt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D. Mass. 1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974);
Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 265 (D. Md. 1972); Hamilton v Love, 328 F. Supp.
1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Detention also is required where the accused cannot meet the
standards for release on his own recognizance. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 135
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
2 582 F.2d at 1293-94. Several courts have found the eighth amendment directly applica-
ble to pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 301-303 (E.D. Mo. 1973)
(pretrial detainees entitled to eighth amendment protection where prison conditions inhu-
mane); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (D. Md. 1972) (prison conditions
weighed directly against eighth amendments standards); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
93, 99-100 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nor, Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)
(eighth amendment directly applicable to pretrial detainees).
24 582 F.2d at 1293-94.
2 Id.
See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Feely v. Sampson, 570 F.2d
364, 370 (1st Cir. 1978); Patterson v. Morrisette, 564 F.2d 1109, 1110 (4th Cir. 1977); Duran
v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d
Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d
835, 857-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
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than necessary to ensure the presence of a detainee at trial.2 Excessive
conditions of confinement, like excessive bail requirements, violate the due
process rights of detainees awaiting trial.2
It is difficult to define what conditions of confinement are so excessive
as to constitute punishment violative of due process. The District of Col-
umbia Circuit recently described pretrial confinement itself as punish-
ment.2 Although confinement is to be only as severe as necessary to assure
appearance of a detainee at trial,3" there is a fine line separating condi-
tions of confinement intended to guarantee trial appearance and those
constituting punishment.31 Therefore, a majority of circuits considering
the issue have developed a bare minimum test, such as that adopted by
the Fourth Circuit in Loe, to determine whether conditions of confinement
offend due process.3 2 The bare minimum test dictates that if conditions
of confinement would violate the eighth amendment protections against
cruel and unusual punishment if imposed. on a convicted prisoner, then
those conditions violate the due process rights of a pretrial detainee.?
2 See, e.g., Patterson v. Morrisette, 564 F.2d 1109, 1110 (4th Cir: 1977). The pretrial
detainee may be deprived of his rights in order to restrain him from endangering or disrupting
the security of the institution in which he is held. Id.
The American Bar Association Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners recog-
nized the special status ofpretrial detainees in its recently promulgated tentative draft for
the freedom of detainees. ABA Joint Comm. on the Legal Status of Prisoners, Tentative Draft
of Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CrM. L. REv. 377, 565 (1977).
According to the draft, restrictions on the right of movement inside a jail and on the right to
communicate with free citizens should be as minimal as institutional security and order
allow. Id.
See Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pretrial detention itself indis-
tinguishable from punishment). See also Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project
in CmE & JUSTicE 403 (1971); Note, Constitutional Limitation on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L. J. 941, 946 (1970).
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
3, Feely v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978).
3 See, e.g., id.; Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Nosser,
438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971).
3 In Feely v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978), the First Circuit declared that it is
impossible to conceive of situations where treatment so cruel or unusual as to violate the
eighth amendment if applied to a convicted prisoner would satisfy a detainee's due process.
Id. at 370. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions of confinement were held to constitute
punishment violative of due process in Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 1977).
The Second Circuit in Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), found violations of due
process, id. at 339, and equal protection. Id. at 338. The court stated that conditions of
detention may themselves constitute punishment and thereby deny due process which re-
quires that a detainee shall not be punished until convicted. Id.
Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972), was factually analogous to Loe. In
Fitzke, a pretrial detainee was held for seventeen hours without attention to his medical
needs. Id. at 1074. As a result, he had to undergo a crainiotomy. Id. The Sixth Circuit held
that the right to medical care while incarcerated is a basic concept of due process. Id. at 1076.
While not expressly referring to the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the court spoke of the limits of detention for convicted prisoners. The court in
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Some courts state that pretrial detainees are entitled to protections
greater than those of the eighth amendment, but the standards articulated
are imprecise. 4 The Fourth Circuit concluded that it need not determine
the exact scope of due process protection in Loe since the medical mistreat-
ment complained of would violate the eighth amendment prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment if inflicted on a convicted prisoner.,
The court found Loe could recover damages from both the state and
federal officers to remedy the alleged violation of his due process rights."
The Fourth Circuit held that state officers in Loe had potential damage
liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of the plaintiff's due
process rights.37 The court also found that damage liability for federal
marshals, who were not subject to an action under section 19831 or any
other federal statute," could be predicated solely on the fifth amendment. 0
The Fourth Circuit based recognition of this cause of action on the Su-
preme Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4" In Bivens, the court held that a violation of
the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures could be remedied by a damage action, without any specific statu-
Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), explicitly held that a violation of the eighth
amendment standards would constitute a violation of due process. Id. at 189.
See, e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Duran v. Elrod, 542
F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976). Campbell involved a class action by pretrial detainees seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. The court agreed that protection from cruel and unusual
punishment is a matter of due process. 580 F.2d at 532. The court stated, however, that there
are no simple tests of the constitutionality of the conditions of pretrial confinement. Id. at
531. The court held the presumption of innocence requires that the care afforded pretrial
detainees be greater than that given convicted prisoners. Id. The Duran court explicitly
declared that a standard more stringent than thd eighth amendment controls the treatment
of pretrial detainees. 542 F.2d at 999-1000. To show the reasonableness of its approach, the
Fourth Circuit in Loe contrasted its due process equal to the eighth amendment test with
the stricter standards. 582 F.2d at 1294.
582 F.2d at 1294.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1293. A person who deprives another of his constitutional rights under color of
state law is liable in an action at law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
1- Violations of the Constitution under color of federal law are not actionable under §
1983. Roots v. Calahan, 475 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th
Cir. 1971).
11 The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976), provides no basis
of recovery for constitutional violations by federal officials. The Act is couched in terms of
state common law torts and allows recovery only "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). If states do not consider
constitutional violations as independent torts, the Federal Tort Claims Act provides no rem-
edy. See generally Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counselling
Hesitation," 9 IND. L. Rav. 441 (1976) [hereinafter "Special Factors']; see also, Torres v.
Taylor, 456 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (prisoner denied recovery on Bivens-type fifth
amendment claim since his suit for damages arising out of assault and battery cognizable
under Federal Tort Claims Act).
582 F.2d at 1293.
4 Id., citing 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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tory authorization. 2
The Fourth Circuit recognized that Bivens was distinguishable from
Loe in that Bivens addressed the availability of a damage remedy under
the fourth amendment, 3 but concluded that there is no logical basis for
limiting Bivens to violations of the fourth amendment." The court ob-
served that other federal courts applying the rationale of Bivens have
created causes of action against federal officials for violations of constitu-
tional rights other than those embodied in the fourth amendment.45 In fact,
the majority of federal courts addressing the issue of a right to damages
based solely on a constitutional provision have established remedies for
violations of the first, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments."6
42 403 U.S. at 397. In Bivens, federal agents acting without probable cause arrested the
plaintiff and searched him and his home. Id. at 389 n.1. The Supreme Court held that even
absent a statutory right, a damage remedy may be sustained against federal officials who
violate a plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 397-98. The Court noted that state
remedies were unavailable, id. at 394, and that an award of damages was the ordinary remedy
for an invasion of personal liberty. Id. at 395. Moreover, the Court maintained that there were
no special factors, such as a federal statutory remedy, counselling hesitation to grant such
relief. Id. at 396. Although the decision created a "constitutional tort" under federal common
law, the parameters of the new remedy were not stated. The absence of a limitation on the
reach of the Bivens decision gives it vitality for the proposition of a similar remedy for other
violations of the Constitution. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As
A Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1972); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a
Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HAsTiNGS
CONST. L. Q. 531, 604 (1977); Note, Constitutional Law-Federal Agents Conducting Unrea-
sonable Searches and Seizures Are Liable for Damages Under the Fourth Amendment, 50
TEX. L. REv. 798 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Federal Civil Remedies-Implied Cause
of Action for Fourth Amendment Violations, 46 TuL. L. Rav. 816 (1972).
582 F.2d at 1294. The Supreme Court has suggested a broad reading of its open ended
remedy announced in Bivens. While failing to explicitly elaborate on the Bivens doctrine, the
Court has suggested its application in cases involving the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
See Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 209-10 n.14 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); City
of Kenosha v. Bueno, 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1973); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,
432-433 (1973); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 14 n.7 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 582 F.2d at 1294. The Fourth Circuit recognized that damage remedies might not be
appropriate where special factors are present. Id. Such factors include a congressional decla-
ration that an action against government agents for money damages is inappropriate in light
of another equally effective remedy or that money damages are not generally apropriate for
an injury. Id. The Bivens court mentioned that special factors might disallow constitutional
tort remedies. 403 U.S. at 395-96; see "Special Factors," supra note 39.
5 582 F.2d at 1294.
4 See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (allowed damages on the basis
of the fourteenth amendment, endorsing broad usage of Bivens-type remedy); Dellums v.
Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (remedy based solely upon first amendment); Mahone
v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (remedy based solely on fourteenth amendment);
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remedy based on fifth amendment); Tritsis v.
Backer, 501 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1974) (remedy based on sixth and ninth amendments);
Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (remedy based on eighth amendment).
Contra, Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Col. 1974) (no first amendment extension




The Fourth Circuit previously addressed the issue of whether amend-
ments other than the fourth amendment implied a cause of action in States
Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz,47 where it held that a damage action based
solely upon the fifth amendment was appropriate." In States Marine
Lines, the plaintiff sued for damages after U.S. customs agents illegally
boarded its vessel in the port of Charleston and seized cargo.49 The plaintiff
contended that the boarding and seizure violated the fifth amendment and
that Bivens authorized a damage action based directly on the fifth amend-
ment." The court ordered that on remand the district court could award
damages based solely upon the fifth amendment for the injury to the
plaintiff's property.5
The Bivens Court, in allowing damages based on the fourth amend-
ment, declared that an action for damages was the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty." The Supreme Court did not
address the issue of a damage action for an invasion of property interests
based directly on the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit in States Marine
Lines nevertheless authorized a property damage action based solely on
the fifth amendment because the Supreme Court had permitted suits for
deprivation of property without due process under section 1983.11 The court
stated that it would be anamolous to deny damages under the fifth amend-
ment for a deprivation of property without due process if a similar action
could be maintained under section 1983.11 Thus, States Marine Lines rep-
resents an extension of the Bivens reasoning both to effectuate the due
process protections of the fifth amendment and to apply those protections
to property interests.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Loe was less expansive than its opinion
in States Marine Lines. Although the Bivens doctrine of an action based
solely on the Constitution was extended in both cases to allow an action
based on the fifth amendment, the Loe decision concerned a personal
interest in liberty, the same concern of the Bivens court. States Marine
Lines extended Bivens to allow an action for the protection of property
interests. Since the Fourth Circuit in States Marine Lines not only ex-
tended Bivens to the fifth amendment but also extended it to protect
property interests, the narrower holding in Loe is well supported by preced-
ent in the Fourth Circuit. The case breaks no new ground in allowing an
action for damages based only on the fifth amendment.
55
" 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
4, Id. at 1157.
" Id. at 1147-48.
"' Id. at 1156.
" Id. at 1159.
12 403 U.S. at 395.
498 F.2d at 1154, citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
498 F.2d at 1154.
"' The Loe dissent relied on a recent Fifth Circuit case, Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (1978), to argue against an action based only on
the fifth amendment. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit denied damages in an action based solely
on the fifth amendment, where a former female member of Congressman Otto Passman's
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The plaintiff's ability to maintain a suit based solely on the fifth
amendment required the Loe court to examine the plaintiffs statement of
his claim."6 The finding that the medical mistreatment claim was sufficient
to prevent dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)"7 resulted from an application of
Estelle v. Gamble"6 in which the Supreme Court established the standard
for a prisoner's statement of a cognizable medical claim. The court also
adhered to the liberal rules of pleading interpretation."
The Supreme Court in Estelle held that in order to avoid dismissal
under 12(b)(6), a prisoner's complaint of medical mistreatment need only
allege facts constituting deliberate indifference of authorities to the pris-
oner's medical needs.60 Although the Estelle court dealt with a prisoner's
claim of medical mistreatment violative of the eighth amendment, the
Estelle standard is equally applicable to a complaint concerning a pretrial
detainee's fifth amendment due process rights. The Fourth Circuit equates
those due process rights with the protections of the eighth amendment.6
Under the Fourth Circuit formulation, conditions which would violate a
prisoner's eighth amendment rights would also violate a pretrial detainee's
fifth amendment due process rights." Similarly, a complaint which alleges
facts sufficient to constitute an eighth amendment violation would suffice
as a complaint asserting a due process violation. The Fourth Circuit's
extension of the Estelle deliberate indifference test to claims brought
under the fifth amendment establishes the same minimal pleading require-
ments for all prisoners. 3 Convicts and pretrial detainees with claims of
personal staff alleged she had been dismissed solely on the basis of sex. Id. at 801.
The Loe dissent agreed with the Davis court's prediction that judicial recognition of a
tort action based solely on the fifth amendment would inundate the court with litigants. 582
F.2d at 1298 (Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the particular plaintiff in Loe had
filed twelve actions in federal district court and had taken seven appeals to the Fourth
Circuit. Id. at 1298 n.1.
The Loe majority distinguished Davis on the basis that a suit against a U.S. congressman
was statutorily barred, a factor counselling hestitation in granting a Bivens-type remedy. 582
F.2d at 1294-5 n.2; see text accompanying note 44 supra.
-4 582 F.2d at 1295.
Id. at 1296. The en route handcuffing was not actionable. See text accompanying note
12 supra.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.s. 97 (1976).
5' See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); Bolding v.
Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3203 (1978); Vinnedge v.
Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977).
As in Loe, the plaintiff in Vinnedge was incarcerated in a municipal Northern Virginia
jail. He vaguely alleged that his request for medical and psychiatric care while in jail was
conditioned on withdrawal of his request for counsel and confession to the crime for which
he was arrested. 550 F.2d at 928. The court declared that no matter how unskillfully pleaded,
pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Id. Enough was pleaded to avoid dismissal,
but amendment on remand was suggested. Id. at 929.
11 429 U.S. at 104-105.
5' See text accompanying note 4 supra.
82 See 582 F.2d at 1294.
The Fourth Circuit in Loe drew an inference of deliberate indifference from the unu-
sual length of delay in Loe's initial treatment. 582 F.2d at 1296. According to the court, the
complaint of subsequent mistreatment of the arm alleged nothing more than unsatisfactory
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